We develop a mo del of international trade with a monopsonistically competitive labour market in which firms employ skilled labour for headquarter tasks andu n s k i l l e dw o r k e r st oc o n d u c ta continuum of production tasks. Firms can enter foreign markets through exporting and through offshoring, and we show that due to monopsonistic competitiono u rm o d e lm a k e ss h a r p l yd i fferent predictions, both at the firm level and at the aggregatelevel,abouttherespectiveeffects of the export of goods and the offshoring of tasks. At the firm-level, exporting leads to higher wages and employment, while offshoring of production tasks reduces the wages paid to unskilled workers as well as their domestic employment. At the aggregate level, trade in goods is unambiguously welfare increasing since domestic resources are reallocated to large firms with high productivity, and firms with low productivities exit the market. This reduces the monopsony distortion present in autarky, where firms restrict employment to keep wages low, resulting in too many firms that are on average too small. Offshoring on theo t h e rh a n dg i v e sfi r m s additional scope for exercising their monopsony power by reducing their domestic size, and as ac o n s e q u e n c et h er e s o u r c e ss p e n to ni tc a nb ew a s t e f u lf r o masocial planner's point of view, leading to a welfare loss. JEL-Classification: F12, F16, F23.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
"It is ignorance, heterogeneous preferences, and mobility costs that are the most plausible sources of frictions in the labour market. The consequence of these frictions is that employers who cut wages do not immediately lose all their workers. [...] The labour supply curve facing the firm is, as a result, not infinitely elastic." -Manning (2003,p . 4 ) In this paper, we develop a new model of international trade and offshoring with a monopsonistically competitive labour market. In the presence of monopsony power firms face upward sloping labour supply functions, and we show that as a direct consequence exporting of goods and offshoring of tasks have potentially very different effects both at the firm level and at the aggregate level. Key to this difference is a hitherto unexplored motive for offshoring that arises if firms have market power in the labour market: By moving offshore part of their tasks firms can reduce domestic employment, and thereby the wage rates they have to pay at home, without having to reduce their output. In contrast, if a firm chooses to export it has to increase its domestic employment, and therefore the wage it pays its domestic workers necessarily goes up. This finding is strongly supported by the evidence reported in Hummels et al. (2014 Hummels et al. ( , 2018 , who show that employment and wages of unskilled workers increase through exporting and decrease due to offshoring. The important insight that firms can use their monopsonistic power in the labour market to lower domestic wages by reducing their domestic employment also provides a rationale for the somewhat counterintuitive finding of Alfaro and Charlton (2009)thatthemajorpartofv erticalforeigndirect investment is observed between similar economies. 1 Building on recent contributions to labour economics (see Manning, 2003; Ashenfelter et al., 2010) , we associate monopsonistic competition with an upward-sloping, firm-specific labour supply curve. We provide a microfoundation for this supply curve in ag e n e r a le q u i l i b r i u mf r a m e w o r k , by utilising a discrete choice mechanism, giving workers independently and identically distributed preferences over a continuum of firms (see McFadden, 1976; Thisse and Toulemonde, 2010; Card et al., 2018) . Facing upward-sloping labour supply curves, firms that aimt oh i r em o r ew o r k e r s must pay higher wages to compensate the marginal worker of a now larger workforce for the utility loss from giving up alternative workplace options. As a consequence, larger firms pay higher wages -w e l li nl i n ew i t ht h er i c he v i d e n c eo nfi r m -s i z ew a g ep r e m i a( see Oi and Idson, 1999 ,f o ra n overview).
To study the differential effects of exp orting and offshoring, we embed our model of the labour market into a general equilibrium trade model with heterogeneous firms. Firms draw their pro-ductivity levels from a common distribution as in Melitz (2003) , and they hire skilled workers for performing headquarter tasks and unskilled workers for performing a continuum of production tasks. Both exporting and offshoring are subject to fixed and variable trade costs. Assuming -similar to Armenter and Koren (2015)a n dAntrás et al. (2017)-t h a tfi r m sd i ff e ri nt h e i rfi x e dc o s t s of foreign market entry, we obtain a model in which domestic producers, exporters, offshorers, and offshoring exporters coexist over wide ranges of the productivity distribution, in line with the evidence reported by Tomiura (2007) , Hallak and Sivadasan (2013) , and Antràs and Yeaple (2014) . In the baseline specification of our model, we consider an open economy with two identical countries and assume similar to Antràs and Helpman (2004) t h a to n l yp r o d u c t i o nt a s k sc a nb e offshored. We impose these specific assumptions, which are relaxed in an extension, to highlight in the simplest possible way that our model can explain the finding of Alfaro and Charlton (2009) that a major part of vertical foreign direct investment is observed between similar economies as well as the finding of Hummels et al. (2014)t h a t ,i nc o n t r a s tt oe x p o r t i n g ,fi r m -l e v e le m p l o y m e n t and wage effects of offshoring on skilled and unskilled workersa r ea s y m m e t r i c .
The monopsonistic structure of the labour market not only gives firms an incentive to offshore, but also provides a natural constraint for the extent of offshoring since moving (additional) tasks offshore drives up the wage a firm has to pay to its foreign workers along the upward-sloping supply curve it faces abroad. With identical countries, no firm will therefore put offshore more than half the production tasks, and in the presence of positive variable costs for trading tasks internationally the share is strictly lower than one half. The availability of offshoring effectively gives firms access to a technology that allows them -at a cost -to reduce the wage they pay to unskilled workers. As a result, offshoring firms reduce their overall skill intensity. There is an induced general equilibrium effect that increases in the relative wage of unskilled workers, affecting all firms in manufacturing, including those that do not offshore, as well as the service sector, which provides the fixed input for exporting and offshoring using skilled and unskilled labour with the same cost shares as in manufacturing. Due to this general equilibrium effect, the skill intensity of the service sector rises relative to autarky, and so does the skill intensity of non-offshoring firms in manufacturing. In contrast to offshoring of tasks, the export of goods leaves the skill intensity in the two sectors unaffected.
Both forms of globalisation are also very different regardingt h ew e l f a r ee ff e c t s . E x p o r t i n g is unambiguously welfare increasing since domestic resources are reallocated to large firms with high productivity, and firms with low productivities exit them a rk e t . T hi sre duc e st hem o no ps o n y distortion present in autarky, where firms restrict employment to keep wages low, resulting in too many firms that are on average too small. 2 The reduction in the monopsony distortion adds to the positive welfare effects associated with market exit oft h el e a s tp r o d u c t i v efi r m sa n dw i t h access to foreign product varieties that are well known from other models featuring heterogeneous firms. Offshoring on the other hand gives firms additional scopef o re x e r c i s i n gt h e i rm o n o p s o n y power by reducing their domestic size, and as a consequence the resources spent on it can be wasteful from a social planner's point of view, potentially leading to a loss in aggregate welfare.
The aggregate welfare loss is not certain, however, since also with offshoring domestic labour is reallocated towards high-productivity producers, in this case including the domestic production facilities of foreign offshorers, which by itself is beneficial to social welfare. We also show that, in contrast to exporting, offshoring affects skilled and unskilled workers asymmetrically, and that it improves the relative welfare position of unskilled workers.
There exists a small theoretical literature that provides possible explanations for the existence of vertical foreign direct investment between similar countries, as described by Alfaro and Charlton (2009) . In an influential contribution to this literature, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) develop a model with external increasing returns to scale at the task level. The framework of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)g e n e r a t e sm u l t i p l ee q u i l i b r i a ,a n dv e r t i c a lf o r e i g nd i r e ct investment between identical countries is possible in their model due to the benefits of producing a task in an already large foreign market. By contrast, the models developed by Burstein and Vogel (2010)a n dAntrás et al. (2017)e x p l a i ng l o b a ls o u r c i n go ffi r m sb yi n p u t -s p e c i fi cp r o d u c t i vity differences between countries. We show that monopsonistic competition in the labour market can be an alternative engine of trade in tasks and that the market power that firms have over segments of the labour market provides a powerful motive for two-way offshoring between symmetric countries. 3 Our paper also contributes to a sizeable literature discussing the effects of trade on the wages paid by heterogeneous firms. Examples for studying the effectso fe x p o r t i n ga r eHelpman et al. (2010, 2017) , Davis and Harrigan (2011), and Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) , whereas Amiti and Davis (2012)c o n s i d e re x p o r t so ffi n a lg o o d sa n di m p o r t so fi n t e r m e d i a t e si na ni n t e g r a t e d framework. Although differing in their specific microfoundations, all of these studies generate a firm-size wage premium due to rent sharing between firms and workers. In the models of Sampson (2014)a n dGrossman et al. (2017)afi r m -s i z ew a g ep r e m i u mi st h er e s u l to fp o s i t i v ea s s o r t a t i ve matching between workers of differing ability and firms that differ in productivity. 4 Our model market monopsonies, she noted that "[i]f the supply of labour to individual firms is less than perfectly elastic and if profits are normal the firms will be of less than optimum size [...]"( p .2 9 6 ) .
3 The international business literature (cf. Roza et al., 2011) h a sf o u n dt h a tg a i n i n ga c c e s st oq u a l i fi e dp e r s o n n e l is one of the most important motives for large and medium-sized firms to move parts of their production offshore (see also Schmeisser, 2013,f o ral i t e r a t u r er e v i e w ) .
4 Eckel and Yeaple (2017)p r e s e n tam o d e li nw h i c hfi r m sc a ns c r e e na p p l i c a n t si no r d e rto learn about their abilities. Since screening involves fixed costs, it is only attractive for high-tech firms that make high profits. These firms pay their workers wages that reflect their true abilities, whereas low-tech firms, lacking information on the ability of their workers offer a uniform wage that is on averagel o w e rt h a nt h ew a g ep a i db yh i g h -t e c hfi r m s . Eckel differs from the literature by showing the important difference between trade in goods and trade in tasks for wages and employment at the firm level. Costinot and Vogel (2010)consideramodelwith firm-specific wages, trade, and offshoring in a North-South context. In contrast to our approach, firms in Costinot and Vogel (2010)o n l yp r o d u c ei no n ec o u n t r y ,m a k i n gt h eo ff s h o r i n gd e c i s i o n ab i n a r yc h o i c e . T h ee m p h a s i so nt h efi r m -i n t e r n a lm a r g i no fo ffshoring and its consequences for domestic wages and employment relates our analysis to the North-South trade model of Egger et al. (2016) . 5
Our modelling of a monopsonistically competitive labour market with firm-specific labour supply functions is well grounded in the recent empirical literature, which estimates labour supply elasticities to the firm. Following Manning (2003) , this empirical literature has gained momentum, covering various developed and developing countries, different occupations and time periods.
The empirical strategies range from reduced form estimates (with and without an IV-strategy or natural experiment) to semistructural and structural estimates. 6 The vast majority of studies finds evidence in favour of firm-specific upward-sloping labour supply curves, with -on average -r e l a t i v e l yl o wl a bo u rs u p p l ye l a s t i c i t i e st h a ta r ec o n s i s tent with monopsonistic competition and inconsistent with an infinitely elastic labour supply under perfect competition (cf. Hirsch et al., 2010; Falch, 2011; Naidu and Wang, 2016) .
In the international trade literature the effects of demand-side distortions in the labour market have been largely overlooked. An exception is MacKenzie (2018), who considers trade between two countries with many segmented, industry-location specific labour markets. The assumption of of the oligopoly power of firms in the product market, with the reduction of their oligopsonistic power in the labour market providing a further welfare stimulus. By looking at the effects of trade and Yeaple (2017)s h o wt h a tw a g eo ff e r sb yfi r m sl e a dt oas e l e c t i o ne q u i l i b r i u mwith positive assortative matching between high-ability workers and high-tech firms and to excessive screening from a social planner's point of view. Exporting in this model makes screening attractive for more firms, leads to exit of low-tech firms, and may be welfare decreasing.
5 There is a small literature studying sourcing strategies of firms facing unionised labour markets. Skaksen (2004) distinguishes the wage and employment effects of potential (non-realised) and realised offshoring, and shows that in both cases employment and wage effects go into opposite directions. Eckel and Egger (2009)s h o wt h a tw i t h cooperative bargaining firms have an incentive to invest in a symmetric partner country, in order to improve their threat point in the wage negotiation with the local union. This model can explain negative employment and wage effects of horizontal but not of vertical foreign investment.
6 See Manning (2011)f o rad e t a i l e dl i t e r a t u r er e v i e wa n dSokolova and Sorensen (2018)f o ram e t a -a n a l y s i so f estimations of firm-specific labour supply elasticities. in goods only, MacKenzie (2018)m i s s e st hei m po rt a n tdi ff e re nc ebe t w e e nt ra dei ng oodsa ndt rade in tasks in an environment, in which firms have market power in their product as well as their labour market. 7
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2,w eoutlinethebasicstructureofour model and solve the firm's problem in partial equilibrium. In Section 3,w ec o n s i d e rt h eg e n e r a l equilibrium, discuss the economy-wide labour allocation, and study the effects of exporting and offshoring on welfare in a setting with two symmetric countries. In Section 4,w egiv eupre stric tiv e assumptions regarding the considered parameter domain, discuss offshoring of headquarter tasks, and consider asymmetric countries. The last section concludes with a summary of the most important results.
2T h e m o d e l : b a s i c s
In this section, we outline a model featuring monopolistic competition in the product market and monopsonistic competition in the labour market. We consideraone-sectoreconom yinwhic hfirms use skilled and unskilled labour as inputs into the production of differentiated goods. Firms have access to foreign consumers through exporting, and they havea c c e s st of o r e i g nw o r k e r st h r o u g h offshoring.
Technology and production
Production combines skilled labour (indexed h)a n du n s k i l l e dl a b o u r( i n d e x e dl), using a Cobb-Douglas technology, where we follow Antràs and Helpman (2004)i na s s o c i a t i n gs k i l l e dl a b o u r input with the provision of headquarter tasks and unskilled labour input with the performance of production tasks. As in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) , we consider a continuum of production tasks indexedη ∈ [0, 1]. Firm ω's output, q(ω), is assembled according to Due to this specificity, trade -by making firms bigger -reducesm a t c hq u a l i t y ,w h e r e a sm i g r a t i o n-b ye x p a n d i n g labour supply -increases match quality. Similar to Heiland and Kohler (2018), Macedoni and Tyazhelinikov (2018) discuss the differential effects of product and input market integration in a setting with oligopolistic and oligopsonistic market power of firms. mance of production tasks. Skilled labour for headquarter services has to be hired in the home country, while the unskilled labour input into the performance of production tasks is provided either by domestic or by foreign workers, depending on whether the respective task is kept at home or put offshore. One unit of effective labour input is needed to produce one unit of each task.
In the case of offshoring, production tasks must be imported tothehomecoun try ,incurringan iceberg-type trade cost that is common to all tasks and captured by parameter τ o > 1. Effective labour input per unit of unskilled labour hired abroad is therefore given by 1/τ o ,w he r e a se ff e c t i v e labour input per unit of unskilled labour hired at home is 1. Since production tasks are symmetric in all respects, firms are indifferent between which ones to puto ff s h o r e ,a n dw ec a nr a n kt h e m without loss of generality such that tasks with a lower index are offshored first. Under the sufficient condition that some but not all production tasks are offshoredthisgiv esauniquethresholdη(ω) ∈ (0, 1) that separates tasks put offshore,η<η (ω), from tasks performed at home,η ≥ η(ω).
Accordingly, η(ω)g i v e st h es h a r eo fp r o d u c t i o nt a s k sp u to ff s h o r eb yfi r mω. and θ ∈ (0, 1/2) is a constant that is inversely related to the wage elasticity of labour supply. A microfoundation for the labour supply curves based on a discrete choice mechanism is given in which for firm ω is given by q D (ω)=A q p(ω) −σ , σ>1, with A q being a demand shifter that is exogenous to the firm but endogenous in general equilibrium. Am i c r o f o u n d a t i o nf o rt h ed e m a n d curve is also given in Section 3.
The firms' problem
We denote by f m ,f d ,f e (ω),f o (ω)t h efi x e df a c t o ri n p u t sn e e d e df o rm a r k e te n t r y ,p r o d u c t i o n , exporting, and offshoring, respectively. These factor inputs are purchased from a perfectly competitive service sector at a common price s per unit. As discussed in detail below, we allow the fixed cost of exporting and offshoring to be firm-specific. Furthermore, we use τ e > 1t oc a p t u r e iceberg-type trade costs for exporting and introduce indicator functions I e (ω), I o (ω)todistinguish exporters (with I e (ω)=1)fromnon-exporters,andoffshorers(withI o (ω)=1)fromnon-offshorers, using an asterisk to indicate foreign variables. Then, the firm's problem is to maximise profits
subject to the usual non-negativity constraints as well as (i) the market clearing conditions for the monopsonistically competitive labour markets, which are given by
ing conditions for the monopolistically competitive goods markets, given by q S (ω)=A q p(ω) −σ and q * S (ω)τ −1 e = A * q p * (ω) −σ in the case of exporting; (iii) the requirement that the firm's marketspecific output levels must add up to its aggregate productionl e v e l ,q S (ω)+I e (ω)q * S (ω)=q(ω); and (iv) the production function in Eq. (1).
Profit maximisation can be represented as a five-stage problem. At stage one, firms decide upon market entry and draw their total labour productivity ϕ(ω)a sw e l la st h e i rfi x e df a c t o r input requirements for exporting and offshoring, f e (ω),f o (ω), from common distributions. At stage two, firms decide conditional on the lottery outcome on whether to produce and on whether to export and/or offshore. At stage three, offshoring firms decide upon how many tasks to perform at home and abroad by setting η(ω). At stage four, firms choose their output level q(ω), and the employment of skilled and unskilled labour, ℓ h (ω)a n dℓ l (ω,η), necessary to achieve it. Finally, at stage five firms choose the production output sold at home anda b r o a db ys p l i t t i n gt h e i rt o t a l output q(ω)i n t oq S (ω)a n dq * S (ω). Together, stages three to five represent the intensive firm margin,i nt h a tt h e ys u mu pfi r m s ' optimal decisions along three firm-internal margins highlighted in the trade literature (cf. Egger et al., 2016; Fernandes et al., 2018) : the intensive margin of exporting (stage five), the intensive task margin (stage four), and the extensive task margin (stage three). The intensive firm margin is conditional on the decisions regarding entry as well as taking up production, exporting, and offshoring at the extensive firm margin.R e p r e s e n t i n gt h ee x t e n s i v efi r mm a r g i na st h es o l u t i o n of a two-stage problem follows Melitz (2003)a n da c k n o w l e d g e st h ei m p o r t a n tr o l eo fu n c e r t a i n t y in the market entry decision of firms. We solve the maximisation problem through backward induction. In doing so, we take a partial equilibrium perspective, treating parametrically supply shifters A l , A h , A * l , A * h ,d e m a n ds h i f t e r sA q , A * q and the price for the service input s.
Profit maximisation at the intensive firm margin
The stage five decision is the solution to a simple allocation problem, and profit-maximisation
for exporters. Substitution into product demand allows us toe x p r e s st h er e v e n u e so ffi r mω as
where
measures the relative differential of overall to domestic market size, which is equal to one for non-exporters and equal toκ e ≡ 1+
In order to solve the stage-four problem of finding the profit maximising level of output, given the share of offshored tasks η(ω), we proceed in two steps. First, we derive the cost minimising input ratio for skilled and unskilled labour, and second we use the cost function derived in step one to determine the profit maximising output level. Substituting Eq.
(1)a ndt hem a rk e tc l e a ri ng conditions for skilled and unskilled labour, we can write thes t a g e -f o u rp r o b l e mo fc h o o s i n gc o s tminimising labour inputs as follows:
The first-order conditions with respect to ℓ h and ℓ l (ω,η) can be written as
and
respectively. Combining Eqs. (6)a nd( 7)w i t ht here s pe c t i v el a bo urm a rk e tc l e a ri ngc o ndi t i o nsf o r
firm ω leads to expressions for relative demand at the firm level for the two types of labour:
( 1), solving for ℓ h (ω),s u b s t i t u t i n gt h er e s u l t i n ge x p r e s s i o ni n t ofi r s torder condition (6), and setting β ≡ j=h,l α −α j (1−θ) j to get rid of uninteresting constants, we get the cost function
with The profit maximising output level, given the share of offshored tasks, now follows by simply maximising operating profits 
respectively. Hence, the price charged by firm ω,whic hisidenticaltoitsa v eragerev enue,isrelated to its marginal revenue by the standard markup σ/(σ − 1),r e fl e c t i n gt h efi r m ' sm o n o po l ypo w e ri n the goods market. In addition, the average variable cost paidb yfi r mω,w h i c hi saC o b b -D o u g l a s index of the skilled and unskilled wage rate, is a mark-down 1 − θ on its marginal cost, reflecting the firm's monopsony power in the labour market. The relative difference between the price and the average variable cost corresponds to the product of the price markup and the wage markdown and it is independent of the output level because product demand and labour supply are iso-elastic.
The output of firm ω as an explicit function of its offshored task range η(ω) follows as
is a composite of the economy-wide aggregates A q , A l , A h ,a n dγ ≡ (1 − θ)(σ − 1)/σ is the inverse of the product of price markup and wage markdown.
In order to find the profit maximising task range η(ω) conditional on offshoring, stage three of the profit-maximisation problem, we substitute q(ω) from Eq. (10) 
This shows that as a consequences of monopsonistic competition in the labour market an offshoring firm splits its task production between the two markets, η(ω) ∈ (0, 1),a n dt h ep r o fi t -m a x i m i s i n g task allocation ensures cost savings from offshoring, due to κ o (ω)= 1+
( 11)f u r t h e r m o r es h o w st h a ti nt h ec a s eo fi d e n t i c a lc o u n t r i e s( A l = A * l )fi r m s offshore at most half their tasks (if τ o =1 ), and that this share is decreasing in the variable offshoring cost.
Using the solution for κ o (ω),w ec a ne x p r e s sr(ω) in logarithmic form as follows:
The elasticity of revenues with respect to total labour productivity ϕ(ω) is given by In analogy to firm-level revenues, we can in a further step determine the impact of exporting and offshoring on domestic firm-level employment and wages. Denoting by ℓ l (ω) ≡ [1−η(ω)]ℓ l (ω,η) total unskilled labour input used for the performance of production tasks at home, we can express domestic wages and domestic employment for labour of type j = h, l in logarithmic form as follows:
Eqs. (13)a n d ( 14) Proof The proposition follows from Eqs. (13)a n d( 14)a n dt h ea n a l y s i si nt h et e x t .
In contrast to models in which wage differences follow from a rent-sharing mechanism (cf. Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009 Kreickemeier, , 2012 Amiti and Davis, 2012; Helpman et al., 2010) , wages in our model depend positively not on the economic success of the firm but -via the upward sloping labour supply curve -on its local employment. This difference is important in the case of offshoring, where a decrease in local employment of the offshoring firm occurs for production workers, while operating profits increase. Hence our model cannot only explain that exporters are exceptional producers that are larger and pay higher wages than non-exporters (see Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999; Frías et al., 2018) More specifically, our model accords with the evidence for Danish firms that offshoring leads to an increase in the wage and employment of skilled workers and to ad e c r e a s ei nt h ed o m e s t i cw a g e and employment of unskilled workers. 9
Profit maximisation at the extensive firm margin
With the solutions from the previous subsection at hand, we now turn to firm ω's stage-two problem of choosing its modus operandi.T h i si n v o l v e st h r e ed i ff e r e n td e c i s i o n s .O nt h eo n eh a n d ,t h efirm , having entered the market, decides on whether to start production, in which case it has to pay a 
T o g e t h e r , these three assumptions ensure that the least productive firms stay out of the market, whereas the least productive producers do not export or offshore.
Denoting the operating profits of domestic firms, exporters, offshorers and offshoring exporters by π d (ω), π e (ω), π o (ω) and π eo (ω),r e s p e c t i v e l y ,w ec a nf o r m u l a t ei n d i ff e r e n c the productivity threshold ϕ d eo (ω) that makes firms with a total labour productivity equal to the threshold indifferent between domestic production and exporting plus offshoring. The three productivity thresholds are proportional to ϕ d and given by
For a full characterisation of all p ossible alternatives andtheirrelativeattractiveness,wefinally compare the operating profits of exporters and offshorers witht h eo p e r a t i n gp r o fi t so fo ff s h o r i n g exporters. This determines the two conditions π eo (ω)−π e (ω)=sf o (ω) and π eo (ω)−π o (ω)=sf e (ω), which we can use to characterise the productivity thresholds ϕ e eo (ω) and ϕ o eo (ω).Afi r mw i t ht o t a l labour productivity equal to ϕ e eo (ω) is indifferent between exporting and exporting plus offshoring, while a firm with a productivity level equal to ϕ o eo (ω) is indifferent between offshoring and offshoring plus exporting. The productivity thresholds thus describeda r eg i v e nb y 10
We now show, as a function of fixed exp ort requirement f e (ω),w h i c hfi r mt y p e sc a na r i s ei n equilibrium. As we discuss more formally in the Appendix, there are three parameter domains:
and ϕ e (ω) <ϕ e eo (ω). In this group of firms, domestic firms with ϕ(ω) ∈ ϕ d ,ϕ e (ω) ,e x p o r t e r sw i t hϕ(ω) ∈ ϕ e (ω),ϕ e eo (ω) ,a n do ff s h o r i n ge x po r t e r sw i t hϕ(ω) ≥ ϕ e eo (ω) coexist.
For firms withκ
,ϕ e (ω) .I n this group of firms, domestic firms with ϕ(ω) ∈ ϕ d ,ϕ d eo (ω) and offshoring exporters with ϕ(ω) ≥ ϕ d eo (ω) coexist.
For firms with
. In this group of firms, domestic firms with ϕ(ω) ∈ ϕ d ,ϕ o (ω) ,o ff s h o r e r sw i t hϕ(ω) ∈ ϕ o (ω),ϕ o eo (ω) ,a n do ff s h o r i n ge x po r t e r sw i t hϕ ≥ ϕ o eo (ω) coexist.
Since we have shown above that firm-level revenues increase int o t a ll a b o u rp r o d u c t i v i t y ,h i g h e r levels of ϕ(ω) are associated with a higher degree of internationalisation. As a consequence, offshoring exporters always exist for sufficiently high realisations of total labour productivity.
Furthermore, our mo del supp orts co existence of exp orters and offshorers if firms in parameter ranges 1. and 3. exist, i.e. if there is sufficient heterogeneity in the firm population regarding the relative size of fixed offshoring costs and fixed exporting costs.
We finally turn to the market entry decision at stage one. Similar to Melitz (2003) 
We asso ciate the common element f (ω) with a firm's general ability to become an international producer and assume that it is distributed according to the continuously differentiable function With these assumptions at hand, we can formulate the following proposition. Proof See the Appendix.
The coexistence of different types of producers and their overlap in the productivity and revenue distributions is a stylised fact reported for instance by Tomiura (2007) 
wheref
is 
Differentiation of χ e , χ o ,a n dχ eo gives the intuitive result that the fraction of exporters and Firms enter the productivity lottery as long as under the veilofuncertaint ytheexpectedprofits of doing so exceed the fixed cost of market entry sf m .T h ee x p e c t e dp r o fi t so fp o t e n t i a le n t r a n t s are denoted E[ψ],d e r i v e di nt h eA p p e n d i x ,a n dg i v e nb y
denotes the ratio of operating profits in the open and the closed economy and
is another weighted average of the firm-specific fixed cost parameter f (ω) that is different fromf . 
3G e n e r a l E q u i l i b r i u m
We now emb ed the firm-level analysis into a general equilibrium framework. In our benchmark model, we consider trade between two identical countries, each endowed with N l > 0 unskilled and N h > 0 skilled workers. Workers supply one unit of labour of the respective skill type and can seek employment in the monopsonistically competitive labour market of the manufacturing sector, earning firm-specific wages there, or they can seek employment in a perfectly competitive service sector. The service sector provides the fixed factor input for market entry, production, exporting, and offshoring. In the spirit of Bernard et al. (2007), we assume that service production requires both types of labour and uses a Cobb-Douglas technology with the same cost shares as manufacturing. We normalise this technology to get rid of uninteresting constants and write the average cost and thus the price of one unit of service input as s = s α h h s α l l ,wheres h ,s l are the wages of skilled and unskilled labour in the service sector. Using Shephard's lemma, we can determine the demand for skilled and unskilled labour per unit of service input as ℓ s h = α h (s l /s h ) α l and ℓ s l = α l (s h /s l ) α h ,r e s pe c t i v e l y .
Microfoundations for goods demand and labour supply
Following Ethier (1982) is given by 13
The probability of a worker to choose firm j depends positively on the wage paid by this firm, w j (ω), and negatively on a weighted economy-wide aggregate of all wages paid by manufacturing firms, 
Factor allocation
Prior to the entry of firms, skilled and unskilled workers makeas e c t o r a lc h o i c ea n dd e c i d eu p o n seeking employment in manufacturing or the service sector. The sectoral choice of workers is irreversible, because the fixed factor input of services is employed prior to the hiring of production workers, and it is made under uncertainty about the realisation of amenities and wages in the sector of manufacturing. Being risk-neutral, workers choose the alternative that promises the highest expected utility. Therefore, in equilibrium the service sector wage s j needs to be equal to the expected utility from working in manufacturing, which wed e n o t eb yv j .S i n c ea l lw o r k e r sa r e indifferent between manufacturing firms ex ante,v j is also equal to the expected utility E[v j (ν, ω)].
Since firm-level wages are known with certainty, we havē
where the first equality sign follows from Eq. (24), and the second equality sign follows from the fact that the firm with the highest expected amenity level mustb et h efi r mt h a tp a y st h el o w e s t wage rate. Accordingly, the expected utility of employment as a production worker is given by the lowest wage paid by manufacturing firms. As formally shown in the Appendix, for both skill types the lowest wage is paid by the domestic producer with productivity ϕ d .D e n o t i n gt h ew a g ep a i d α l ,w h e r e a ss k i l l e da n du n s k i l l e dl a b o u rd e m a n dp e ru n i to ffi x e ds e r v i c ei n p u ti s given by ℓ s h = α h (s l /s h ) α l and ℓ s l = α l (s h /s l ) α h ,r e s p e c t i v e l y . D e n o t i n gb yℓ d j the labour input of skill type j in the domestic firm with total labour productivity ϕ d ,w ec a nl i n kℓ d j and ℓ s j by
The first equality sign follows from applying first-order conditions (6)and (7)totheleastproductive domestic producer, the second equality sign uses the zero-profit condition π d = sf d ,a n dt h et h i r d equality sign uses indifference condition w d j = s j . We make use of the relationship b etween ℓ d j and ℓ s j established by Eq. (26)t ol i n ks e c t o r -w i d e employment in manufacturing and services. To determine sector-wide employment in services, we can substitute Eq. (21)i n t ot h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t 
Sector-wide employment in manufacturing can be computed by aggregating employment from Eq. 
with Λ h (·) < Λ l (·) and Λ h (·) < ∆(·).T h e r e b y , g g−(1−θ)ξ Λ j (·) gives the ratio of domestic type-j employment in the average and the marginal firm, with Λ j (1, 1) = 1 and Λ j (κ e ,κ o ) > 1 ifκ e > 1 and/orκ o > 1.
Eqs. (27)and (28)linksector-lev elemplo ymen ttothemassoffirms,whic hisitself endogenous.
14 Since firms cannot observe the amenity draws of their applicants, they pay the same wage to all their workers. As a consequence, workers differ in their ex post utility levels from employment because they differ in their amenity level from working for a firm. From an ex post perspective, thisg e n e r a t e sr e n ts h a r i n gb e t w e e nt h efi r ma n di t s infra-marginal workers, similar to Card et al. (2018) .
In the Appendix, we show how to find closed-form solutions in terms of model parameters for these variables as well as for the relative wage rate paid by the least productive firm. We get
as well as
Eqs. (29) Proof See the Appendix.
Our result of the prevalence of two-way offshoring between identical countries is well in line with the evidence reported by Alfaro and Charlton (2009)t h a tv e r t i c a lm u l t i n a t i o n a la c t i v i t yp r edominantly exists between symmetric countries. The inducedc h a n g e si na v e r a g es k i l li n t e n s i t i e s at the sector level have a straightforward intuition. Start with the case of exclusive offshoring, where the intuition is easiest seen by distinguishing between a direct and an indirect wage effect.
The availability of offshoring effectively gives firms access to a technology that allows them -at a cost -to reduce the wage they pay to unskilled workers. This iswhatw ecallthedirectw ageeffect.
As a consequence, there is an increase in demand for unskilledw o r k e r sb yt h o s efi r m st h a tc h oo s e to offshore, reducing overall skill intensity of offshoring firms. For each firm the additional demand for unskilled workers arises in its offshore location, but this does not matter for our argument since the countries are identical, and therefore the aggregate effect on the demand for unskilled labour is the same in both markets. The positive demand shock for unskilled labour leads to an increase in the relative wage of unskilled workers in general equilibrium, affecting all firms in manufacturing, including those that do not offshore, as well as the service sector. This is the indirect wage effect.
As a consequence of the indirect effect, the skill intensity oft h es e r v i c es e c t o rr i s e s ,a n ds od o e s the skill intensity of non-offshoring firms in manufacturing.F o rt h eo ff s h o r i n gfi r m s ,t h ei n d i r e c t wage effect partially reverses the direct wage effect, but doesn o tf u l l yo ff s e ti t . 15 Due to labour market clearing, the increase in the skill intensity for the service sector and the non-offshoring manufacturing firms must be matched exactly by the lower skilli n t e n s i t yi no ff s h o r i n gfi r m s ,s u c h that the average skill intensity in the economy remains constant.
With exclusive exporting, none of these changes happens. In this case, the reallocation of labor is solely between domestic establishments of manufacturingfirm sa ndbe t w e e nm a n ufa c t uri nga nd services, and since all firms in manufacturing employ the sameratioofskilledandunskilledlabour, which furthermore matches the employment ratio within services, the average skill intensity in each sector is left unchanged. Although the intuition is not as straightforward, we show in the Appendix that the effect of exclusive offshoring on sectoral skill intensities from Proposition 3 carries over to the transition from autarky to an open economy equilibrium with both trade in goods and trade in tasks.
Market efficiency and welfare
For the welfare analysis, we take a utilitarian p ersp ective.S i n c e f o r b o t h s k i l l t y p e s e x p e c t e d utility from employment is equalised across sectors, s j = v j ,a n ds i n c et h i se x p e c t e du t i l i t yi s equal to the wage paid by the domestic firm with total labour productivity ϕ d , v j = w d j ,s o c i a l welfare can be expressed as
is derived in the Appendix and T ≡ γβ − θ
g is a constant. With the welfare function in Eq. (32), we take an ex ante perspective and make use of the fact that firms pay wages that equalise the expected utility of workers from employment in all possible jobs. Due to this, the welfare function does not depend on individual realisationso fa m e n i t i e s ,w h i c hm a k e st h ew e l f a r e effects discussed below accessible to empirical research. 16 The welfare analysis is more involved than in Melitz (2003) , because having monopsonistic competition in the labour market adds a distortion to the model. We illustrate the resulting inefficiency in an online supplement, where we analyse for the closed economy a social planner who can set the same proportional tax rate on the fixed cost of market entry, sf m ,a n dt h efi x e dc o s t of production, sf d ,a n dr e d i s This leads to lower labour demand than in an otherwise identical model with a competitive labour market (see Eq. (14)). With lower employment per firm, there is excessive firm entry. The social planner corrects for the inefficient resource allocation by setting a positive tax rate in order to make firm entry less attractive.
From the theory of second b est (see Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) , we would conjecture that gains from trade exist in our model if the distortion in the labour market is reduced in the open economy, while losses from trade may exist if the distortion is increased. Exporting leads to additional employment in highly productive firms and inducese x i to ffi r m sw i t hl o wl e v e l so f total labour productivity. Since the autarky equilibrium has too many firms, and these firms are too small, exporting works against the initial labour marketd i s t o r t i o n ,a n dw et h e r e f o r ee x p e c t gains from trade in goods. Furthermore, these gains should equally accrue to skilled and unskilled workers since in autarky all firms within manufacturing pay the same skill premium, which equals the skill premium paid in the service sector, and this skill premium is unaffected by the transition to exporting.
Things are different in the case of trade in tasks. First, offshoring potentially reduces welfare since the monopsony distortion is aggravated. This is because the only motive for firms to engage in offshoring is to exploit their monopsony power in the labourm a r k e t ,a n dt h i sc a ni nt u r nm a k e the resources invested for offshoring wasteful from a social planner's point of view. 17 Second, the welfare of skilled and unskilled workers is affected differently by offshoring. As discussed above, offshoring works like a positive demand shock for unskilled labour, and therefore welfare of 16 Although workers' expected utility is equalised across all employment options, our model features wage differentiation between firms, and therefore can be used to rationalise the increase in residual wage inequality between observationally identical workers through trade liberalisation (cf. Amiti and Davis, 2012; Egger et al., 2013; Helpman et al., 2017) . In an online supplement, which is available from the authors upon request, we discuss the differential effects of trade in goods and trade in tasks on residual wage inequality.
17 To see this, one can consider a simplified version of our mo del with homogeneous firms (due to g →∞)w i t h o u t trade in goods (due to τe →∞)a n dn os e l e c t i o ni n t oo ff s h o r i n g( d u et ofo(ω)=0). Inthiscase,offshoringlac ksthe benefit of shifting labour towards high-productivity firms and hence spending resources for it is always wasteful and to the detriment of social welfare. In the setting with heterogeneous firms and selection into offshoring, a negative welfare effect exists if the resource costs for offshoring outweigh the benefits from a more favourable production structure.
unskilled workers rises relative to the welfare of skilled workers. In the service sector, this change in relative welfare is tantamount to the increase in the relative wage of unskilled workers. In manufacturing, the welfare of workers also depends on amenities provided by their employers, and therefore the relative welfare of skilled and unskilled workers and their relative wage can move in opposite directions, and this is exactly what happens in offshoring firms.
We summarise these insights in the following prop osition. , however, different. In Egger et al. (2015) losses from offshoring to a low-wage host country can exist only for a high-wage source country if offshoring is confined to highly productive firms and leads tor e a l l o c a t i o no fw o r k e r sf r o mh i g hproductivity to low-productivity producers, thereby magnifying a pre-existing distortion of the autarky equilibrium. In the current setting, offshoring occurs between identical countries, and the welfare loss can occur despite the reallocation of workers from low-productivity to high-productivity producers.
4D i s c u s s i o n
In this section, we discuss how our results change if we consider a regime in which not all firm types coexist (Section 4.1), allow for offshoring of headquarter and production tasks (Section 4.2), or account for country asymmetries to capture the idea of North-South offshoring (Section 4.3). Eq. (19) , the fraction of firms choosing to become offshoring exporters is given by
Limited coexistence of firm types
and this fraction can be decomposed into the share of offshoring exporters with a cost advantage in exporting or offshoring according to χ e eo = ρχ eo , χ o eo =(1− ρ)χ eo ,r e s pe c t i v e l y . Following the derivation steps from ab ove, we can in a next step express the expected profits of potential entrants by an expression identical to Eq. (21), with ∆(κ e ,κ o ) now given by
Furthermore, aggregating employment over all firms gives an expression identical to Eq. (28), with the new solution for Λ j (κ e ,κ o ) derived in analogy to the main text and given by .15 )i nt heA ppe ndi x ) . Si m i l a rt ot hebe nc hmark model, we find that Λ h (·) < Λ l (·) and Λ h (·) < ∆(·),i m p l y i n gt h a tt h er a n k i n g so ft h e s ek e y aggregators are preserved in the model variant supporting coexistence of only two types of firms.
Since the effects of trade in goods and trade in tasks on the wages paid by the least productive domestic producers in Eq. (33)a r ec h a n n e l e dt h r o u g ha d j u s t m e n t si n∆(·) and Λ j (·),i ti si m m ediate that the welfare analysis from the main text remains qualitatively intact for the alternative parameter domain considered here. In particular, it remainst r u et h a tb o t ht r a d ei ng o o d sa n d trade in tasks lead to a reallocation of labour towards high-productivity firms, whereas the positive welfare implications from this reallocation are counteracted by an efficiency loss materialising in the case of offshoring because the scope for firms to exercise their monopsony power increases.
Offshoring of headquarter and production tasks
In our benchmark model in the first part of the paper, we assumedt ha to nl yuns k i l l e dproduc t i o n tasks are offshorable, which gave us a simple framework that isc o m p a t i b l ew i t ht h ee m p i r i c a l l y observed differential impact of offshoring on firm-level employment and wages of skilled and un-skilled workers (see Hummels et al., 2014) . However, this assumption is not necessary to obtain such a differential effect. To see this, we now consider an alternative production technology that allows for the simultaneous offshoring of skilled headquarter tasks and unskilled production tasks:
In the limiting case in which the offshoring costs for skilled headquarter services are prohibitive, the production function in (37) ( 1). We allow the variable costs of offshoring to be skill-specific and denote them by τ jo > 1.T o d e t e r m i n e t h e profit-maximising levels of labour input, we can follow the analysis in the main text and derive the cost function
which is an expression similar to Eq. (9)w i t hκ[η(ω)] replaced by j=h,l κ j [η j (ω)] and
Then, setting dr(ω)/dq(ω)=dc(ω)/dω we obtain the profit-maximising output level, which is given by an expression similar to Eq. (10)w i t h j=h,l κ j [η j (ω)] substituted for κ [η(ω) ].S e t t i n g κ ′ j [η j (ω)] = 0 finally allows us to solve for
With the solution to the firm's problem at the intensive margin, we can then determine domestic firm-level wages and employment of the two skill types according to
where j,ȷ ∈{h, l}, j ̸ =ȷ,andε j ≡ 1−(α j θξ) −1 < 0.I fs k i l l e dh e a d q u a r t e rt a s k sa sw e l la su n s k i l l e d production tasks can be performed abroad, offshoring can havepo s i t i v eo rne g a t i v edo m e s t i cfirm -level wage and employment effects. Whereas similar to the benchmark model discussed above the direct effect of offshoring induces domestic wages and employment of the skill type performing the offshored task to fall, there is an indirect wage and employment stimulus from offshoring tasks performed by the other skill type. This positive indirect effect exists due to a complementarity of the two skill types in the production of intermediates.
To align the predictions from our mo del with the empirical evidence reported by Hummels (40)a n d( 41)t h a tt h i sr e q u i r e sκ ε l loκ ho < 1 andκ ε h hoκ lo > 1 to hold simultaneously. In the case of symmetric countries, the intended result is achieved under the following parameter constraint: Figure 1 gives an illustration of the possible outcomes. There, we draw the implicit functions
in offshoring cost space.
Figure 1: Firm-level Employment and Wage Effects of Offshoring
The shaded regions above Γ l (τ ho ,τ lo )=0and below Γ h (τ lo ,τ ho )=0refer to trade cost combinations for which the direct effects dominate the indirect effects. To be more specific, in the light-gray shaded region above Γ l (τ ho ,τ lo )=0offshoring costs are comparably high for headquarter tasks and comparably low for production tasks. In this case, the direct effect of offshoring dominates the indirect effect for unskilled workers and vice versa for skilled workers. As a consequence, offshoring lowers wages and employment of unskilled workers and increases wages and employment of skilled workers at the firm level. The opposite is true in the dark-gray shaded re- costs for production tasks, offshoring induces firm-level wages and employment to increase for skilled workers and to decrease for unskilled workers. In thec o n es p a n n e db yΓ l (τ ho ,τ lo )=0and
Γ h (τ lo ,τ ho )=0offshoring costs for headquarter and production tasks are similar, and in this case firm-level wages and employment of both skill types increase due to offshoring. From Figure 1 ,w e can therefore conclude that offshoring cannot have at the samet i m en e g a t i v efi r m -l e v e lw a g ea n d employment effects for both skill types. We also see that the extended model considered here is capable to explain the empirical findings of Hummels et al. (2014) Preserving all other assumptions from our benchmark model, we can determine the ratio of 18 In an online supplement, which is available upon request, we solve the model with offshoring of both tasks in general equilibrium and show that key insights from the benchmark model remain valid in the more sophisticated model considered here, as long as the costs of offshoring headquarter services are sufficiently high. foreign relative to domestic labour market aggregators for unskilled workers according to
where N * l denotes the foreign endowment with unskilled labour. Combining Eq. (8)withthelabour supply schedules τ o
can link foreign to domestic wages by
Accounting for Eqs. (11)a n d( 13), we can then compute 
Eqs. (44)t o( 46)g i v ear e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nκ o and A * l /A l that is derived from labour market equilibrium and can be expressed as A * l /A l ≡ K 1 (κ o ).As e c o n dr e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h e s et w o variables follows from the profit-maximising choice of the task margin in Eq. (11), and we capture this second relationship by A * l /A l ≡ K 2 (κ o ).T h eo p e ne c o n o m ye q u i l i b r i u mi st h e nd e t e r m i n e d by these two relationships as depicted in Figure 2 . From Eq. (11), we know that profit-maximisation establishes a positive link between A * l /A l andκ o .Ah i g h e rv a l u eo fA * l /A l reflects a downward shift of the foreign unskilled labour supply curve relative to the domestic one. This implies larger cost savings from offshoring, leading to a higher value ofκ o (and thus to a larger fraction of tasks put offshore by offshoring firms). As a consequence, locus K 2 (κ o ) is upward sloping in Figure 2 .T h i n g sa r el e s sc l e a rr e g a r d i n gt h es h a p e of locus K 1 (κ o ).O nt h eo n eh a n d ,ah i g h e rc o s ts a v i n gf r o mo ff s h o r i n gκ o induces an increase in offshoring at the intensive and the extensive firm margin, thereby increasing the average foreign relative to the average domestic wage paid in manufacturing according to Eq. (45). This relative wage change shifts the foreign unskilled labour supply curveup w ardsrelativ etothedomesticone, crucially depend on the ranking of Λ h (·), Λ l (·),a n d∆(·).A c c o u n t i n g f o r ε l < 0 and ε h =1 , Eq. (46)e s t a b l i s h e sΛ l (·) < 1 < Λ h (·).S i n c et h e r ei sn oo ff s h o r i n gb yf o r e i g nfi r m s ,t h en e g a t i v e relocation effect on domestic employment of unskilled workers at the firm level translates into an aggregate job loss for this skill group in manufacturing. As ac o n s e q u e n c e ,u n s k i l l e dw o r k e r sn o w lose relative to skilled workers when offshoring becomes an option for domestic firms. However, since Λ h (·) < ∆(·) is preserved from the model with symmetric countries, both skill types gain from offshoring in absolute terms. With the cost saving from offshoring more pronounced, our model therefore shows that, different from the case of symmetric countries and despite an increase in the scope of high-productivity firms to exercise their monopsony power, offshoring to the South is beneficial for the North.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have introduced monopsonistic competitioninthelabourmark etin toanewtrade model with heterogeneous firms. Production requires skilledw o r k e r sf o rp e r f o r m i n gh e a d q u a r t e r tasks and unskilled workers for performing a continuum of production tasks. Crucial for the existence of monopsony power, firms face upward-sloping labour supply curves because they offer workplaces that are horizontally differentiated from the perspective of workers. We show that due to monopsonistic competition in the labour market for skilled and unskilled workers the predictions of our model regarding the effects of trade in goods and trade int a s k sd i ff e rs h a r p l yf r o me a c h other, both at the firm level and at the aggregate level.
At the firm level, the export of goods increases domestic employment and domestic wages of both skill types, whereas offshoring of production tasks lowers domestic employment and domestic wages of unskilled workers but increases domestic employment and domestic wages of skilled workers. This finding is well in line with recent evidence on the differential impact of exporting and offshoring on firm-level wages and firm-level employment. Moreover, since a wage-dampening effect of offshoring on unskilled workers also exists in the case of symmetric countries, the assumption of monopsonistically competitive labour markets makes our model suitable for explaining puzzling evidence on the prevalence of offshoring between similar economies.
At the aggregate level, our model produces novel and interesting welfare results. As a consequence of their monopsonistic market power, firms choose sub-optimally low employment levels to keep their wages low. Therefore, monopsonistic competition in the labour market leads to a misallocation of resources and to the entry of too many and toos m a l lfi r m s . T r a d ei ng o o d sc o nstitutes a partial remedy for this source of inefficiency, because, in a model with selection of firms into exporting by productivity, it gives larger market sharet ohi g h-produc t i v i t yfirm sa ndi nduc e s exit of low-productivity firms, with the welfare stimulus from these effects augmented by access to new, foreign varieties of the differentiated good. As a result, there are gains from trade in goods between symmetric countries.
The welfare effects of offshoring are -by contrast -not unambiguously positive. Gaining access to foreign labour, offshoring firms use their monopsonistic power in the labour market to reduce their domestic employment, and hence the wages they have to pay to their domestic workers.
Due to the labour market distortion, the resources spent on offshoring can be wasteful from a social planner's point of view. With total (domestic plus foreign) labour demand increased by the offshoring firms, trade in tasks is accompanied by a shift ofl a b o u rt o w a r d sh i g h -p r o d u c t i v i t y firms, which by itself is beneficial to social welfare. However, it is not guaranteed that the positive reallocation effect is strong enough to dominate the efficiencyl o s sf r o mt h ei n c r e a s ei nm o n o p s o n y power, and trade in tasks unlike trade in goods can therefore lead to an aggregate welfare loss.
In an extension we show that the important trade-off between ane ffi c i e n c yg a i nf r o mt h er e a llocation of labour towards high-productivity firms and the efficiency loss arising because offshoring increases the scope for these firms to exercise their monopsony power also exists if all offshoring firms are at the same time exporters. Furthermore, the key insight that, unlike trade in goods, trade in tasks between symmetric countries can lower welfarer e m a i n sv a l i dw h e na l l o w i n gf o r offshoring of production as well as headquarter tasks. However, trade in tasks is unambiguously beneficial if countries are strongly asymmetric and the foreign economy does not produce goods itself but serves as an unskilled labour reservoir for the performance of tasks offshored by domestic producers. Capturing the case of North-South offshoring, thec o s t -s a v i n ge ff e c to fo ff s h o r i n gi n this model variant is sufficiently large to dominate any efficiency loss from increasing the scope for high-productivity firms to exercise their monopsony power. 
A.6 Derivation and discussion of Eq. (28)
We can first note that total domestic plus foreign typ e-j employment of pure offshorers and offshoring exporters are given by 
